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Code of Civil Procedure §2033 (repealed);
§2030 (amended).
SB 638 (Song); STATS 1977, Ch 500
Support: Los Angeles Board of Supervisors
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 500 the Code of Civil Procedure
specified procedures governing requests for admissions and interrogatories
in two separate code sections [See CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 732, §2 at 1618
(requests for admissions of facts and genuineness of documents); CAL.
STATS. 1974, c. 732, §2, at 1620 (interrogatories)]. Chapter 500 streamlines
the procedural requirements applied to both of these discovery devices while
combining coverage of both devices into a single code section [See CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE §2030].
Chapter 500 makes no changes in the bases for permissible discovery
[See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §2030(b)(1)], the substance and nature of the
subject matter that may be covered by requests for admissions [See CAL.
Crv. PROC. CODE §2030(h)] and interrogatories [See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE
§2030(g)], or the time limits imposed upon parties propounding [See CAL.
Civ. PRoc. CODE §2030(b)(1), (d)], or responding [See CAL. Clv. PRoc.
CODE §2030(c), (f)], except that, with respect to requests for admissions,
the time for response has been changed from 20 days to 30 days [Compare
CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 732, §2, at 1620 with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§2030(e)(2)]. The format of the propounding and responding documents
are, however, changed considerably. "Propounding document" is the term
ascribed to either a set of written interrogatories or a set of written requests
for admissions of facts and genuineness of documents [CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE §2030(a)(3)] and the requester is deemed the "propounding party"
[CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §2030(a)(1)]. The answer to a propounding docu-
ment is now termed a "responding document" [CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE
§2030(a)(4)], while a document filed in compliance with an order of the
court compelling answers to questions previously propounded and either not
answered or not answered adequately is a "supplemental document" [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(a)(5)]. The party answering in either context is the
"responding party" [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(a)(2)].
Propounding Documents
A propounding document may now be addressed to one party only and
must be in the following form: (1) documents must be paginated and num-
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bered consecutively; (2) no more than four questions may appear on each
page; (3) questions may not be subdivided; and (4) reasonable space must be
provided on the document for an answer to be entered below each question
[CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §2030(b)(2)]. Service of a propounding document
is to be in person or by mail in the manner prescribed for serving notices and
is to be made upon the attorney of record or the responding party only if
there is no attorney of record to be served [CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§2030(i)(2), see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1010-1020].
If a propounding party finds that any response is objectionable and an
answer or further answer is required, he or she may move for a court order
compelling such answers [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(d)]. This motion
for further response made by a propounding party must now set forth, in
relation to each response found objectionable: (1) the number of each
question; (2) the question; (3) the response; and (4) a short statement of the
reasons the original response is deemed insufficient [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
2030(d)].
Responding Documents
The responding party is to subscribe each page of the propounding
document under oath and respond to each question in the space provided on
the propounding document. If the space provided for response is insuffi-
cient, the responding party may append additional pages as necessary and
such pages are to be: (1) paginated consecutively by alphabet; (2) inserted
immediately following the page that propounded the question; and (3)
each signed by the responding party [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(c)].
Service of responding documents must now be made either personally or by
certified mail in the same manner as that required for service of a summons
and complaint [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §2030(i)(1). See generally CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §415.10]. This appears to distinguish the service of
responding documents in that such service must now include a notice and
acknowledgment of receipt as prescribed by Section 415.30(b), which is not
a requirement for the service of propounding documents. Upon receipt of
the responding document the propounding party must prepare and serve a
copy of these documents upon each party who has appeared in the action,
absent a ruling by the court, upon a motion of the propounding party that
compliance with such a requirement is unduly expensive, oppressive, or
burdensome [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(i)(3)]. Even after waiver of the
requirement, however, any party not previously served with a copy of a
responding document may make written demand for service anytime before
final judgment to which the propounding party must respond within 30 days
[CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE §2030(i)(3)]. Chapter 500 extends the time limit for
responding to requests for admissions from 20 days to 30 days, but con-
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tinues to provide that failure to respond to such a request within the
permissible time will result in all requested admissions being deemed
admitted [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(e)(2)]. Failure to respond to written
interrogatories in a timely fashion permits the propounding party to seek
legal sanction upon notice and motion [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2030(e)(1);
see, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§1209(5), 2034].
The procedure to be followed by a propounding party who seeks a court
order to compel a further answer by a responding party remains unchanged
[See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §2030(d)], but a responding party conforming
to a court order for supplemental response must, within 30 days, file a
supplemental document that shall contain, as to each question ordered
answered: (1) the original number of the question as shown in the pro-
pounding document; (2) the question followed by the answer; and, (3) if
there is more than one question ordered to be answered, the questions in
serial order by original number followed by the answer [CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE §2030(f)].
General Provisions
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 500, both requesters and responders
were required to file copies of the first page and any other pages of the
discovery documents for which they were responsible as was necessary to
identify the parties concerned as well as the original affidavit of service
pertaining to the copied document with the clerk of the court or the judge
[CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 732, §1, at 1619 (interrogatories); CAL. STATS. 1974,
c. 732, §2, at 1621 (requests for admissions of facts and genuineness of
documents)]. Chapter 500 waives the filing of proof of service unless a party
seeks relief in which service is an issue at which time a copy of the proof is
to be incorporated in the supporting papers [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§2030(i)(4)]. Furthermore, the propounding or responding attorneys are
now directed to retain any document they prepare for not less than five years
after final disposition of the action in lieu of completing the former filing
procedure [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §2030(1)]. Finally, the Court may order
the filing of a propounding or responding document [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§2030(j)], but must order that a propounding document be furnished to any
person requesting it, even though the requester is not a party to the litigation
[CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §2030(k)].
Chapter 500 therefore appears to have made major alterations in Califor-
nia discovery procedures by prescribing a consistent format for the prepara-
tion of interrogatories and requests for admissions and the responses to them
and by eliminating the necessity for filing copies of discovery documents
with the court in the absence of an immediate need. These two alterations
arguably streamline the discovery procedures in the California court system.
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See Generally:
1) B. NVITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and the Production of Evidence, §§978-989
(interrogatories), §§1004-1010 (request for admission), (2nd ed. 1966); §§978-988 (inter-
rogatories), §§1004-1010 (request for admission) (Supp. 1977).
Civil Procedure; intervention
Code of Civil Procedure §387 (amended).
SB 750 (Holden); STATS 1977, Ch 450
Support: Legal Affairs Unit, NAACP; State Bar of California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 450, the right of persons to intervene in
an action in which they had an interest was apparently a matter solely within
the discretion of the courts and not an absolute right under any circum-
stances [People v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 732, 737, 552 P.2d 760, 763,
131 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1976); People v. City of Long Beach, 183 Cal.
App. 2d 271, 274, 6 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660 (1960); In re Yokohama Specie
Bank, Ltd., 86 Cal. App. 2d 545, 554, 195 P.2d 555, 560 (1948)].
Intervention occurs "when a third person is permitted to become a party to
an action or proceeding between other persons" [CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE
§387 (emphasis added)]. In determining whether intervention should be
permitted the California courts have balanced the interests of the original
parties in pursuing their litigation unburdened by additional parties, against
the need to obviate delay and multiplicity of suits, and the proposed
intervenor's interest, which must be of such direct and immediate character
that he or she will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment [See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 732, 736,
552 P.2d 760, 762, 131 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1976); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Gerlach, 56 Cal. App. 3d 299, 303, 128 Cal. Rptr. 396, 398
(1976); Continental Vinyl Products Corp. v. Mead Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d
543, 549, 552, 103 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810, 812 (1972)]. Under prior law,
however, it was unclear at what time during a legal action intervention was
to take place since Section 387 of the Civil Code previously stated that a
complaint in intervention could be filed "[a]t any time before trial" [CAL.
STATS. 1970, c. 484, §1, at 961], while on the other hand, at least one court
has permitted intervention after the commencement of the trial requiring
only that the right to intervene be asserted within a reasonable time [Sanders
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 661, 666, 668-69, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 415, 418, 420 (1975); 3 B. WrrIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Plead-
ing §201 (Supp. 1977)]. Thus, prior to the enactment of Chapter 450, an
individual had no absolute right to intervene under any circumstances and in
most cases could attempt to intervene only during the "time before trial"
[See CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 484, §1, at 961].
While Chapter 450 continues to leave the determination of when interven-
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tion should be permitted to the sound discretion of the trial court [Compare
CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 484, §1, at 961 with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §387(a)],
the law now also recognizes that a party may have an absolute right to
intervene under certain circumstances [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§387(b)]. A court must now permit a party to intervene upon timely
application when the law confers an unconditional right to intervene [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §387(b)]. Such an unconditional right has been conferred,
for example, upon all those with an interest in land subject to an eminent
domain proceeding [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §1250.230], upon all creditors
in an action on shareholders liability to a corporation [CAL. CORP. CODE
§414], and upon any shareholder or creditor in a proceeding to dissolve a
corporation [CAL. CORP. CODE §1800(c)]. Furthermore, a court must now
permit a party to intervene when: (1) the party seeking intervention claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action; (2) the disposition of the action may impair or impede the party's
ability to protect that interest; and (3) that interest is not adequately repre-
sented by existing parties [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §387(b)]. In addition,
Section 387, as amended by Chapter 450, appears to resolve some of the
ambiguity surrounding the deadline for seeking intervention by no longer
restricting such applications to the "time before trial" and instead permit-
ting intervention "upon timely application" of any person with the requisite
interest in the action [See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §387]. It would appear
that the courts would deem such an application "timely" if: (1) the applica-
tion was submitted with a reasonable period of time after the applicant
learned that the action was in progress; (2) no delay in the trial would be
caused by the proposed intervention; and (3) the proposed intervention
would not result in any prejudice or inconvenience to the original parties
[See Sanders v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668-69, 126
Cal. Rptr. 415, 420 (1975)]. Thus, by adopting a rule that provides an
absolute right to intervene under specified circumstances and by retaining a
conditional right to intervene in other cases upon the timely application of
interested parties, Chapter 450 would appear to conform Section 387 to Rule
24(a) and 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
COMMENT
Chapter 450 was enacted in apparent response to the denial of motions to
intervene under circumstances such as those in DeRonde v. Regents of the
University of California [No. 3 Civ. 16872 (June 20, 1977) (briefing time
deferred pending the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bakke v. Regents of
the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977)]. In DeRonde, the trial
court found that the admissions procedures of the University of California,
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Davis, School of Law were discriminatory and enjoined the school from
utilizing lower standards to admit minorities into the study of law [See Pre-
argument statement for intervenors at 4, DeRonde v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, No. 3, Civ. 16872 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal)].
Although it would appear that women and members of minority groups
might have had a "direct" interest in such admission procedures and the
litigation before the court, and the defense of such an interest might have
necessitated a separate action if the motions to intervene were not granted,
the trial court nonetheless denied all movant's motions to intervene [See id.
at 5-6]. In addition, any determination that such admissions procedures were
unconstitutional might tend to "impair or impede" the rights of some
female and minority group applicants [See id. at 5], whose interests may not
have been "adequately represented" by the University. Thus, by conform-
ing Section 387 to Rule 24(a) and 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Chapter 450 would appear to expand the time period within
which any interested person may seek intervention in an action and to
provide potential parties under certain circumstances, such as those present
in the DeRonde case, with an absolute right to intervene.
See Generally:
1) 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading §§193-215 (intervention) (2d ed. 1971),
(Supp. 1977).
2) Note, Appealability of Orders on Motions to Intervene, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (1963).
Civil lrocedure; bifurcated trials-precedence of issues
Code of Civil Procedure §598 (amended).
AB 295 (Fenton); STATS 1977, Ch 57
Support: State Bar of California
Prior to the appellate court decision in Cook v. Superior Court [ 19 Cal.
App. 3d 832, 97 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1971)], California courts had indicated that
they possessed the inherent discretionary power to bifurcate or separate the
trial of issues pursuant to Section 2042 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that "[tihe order of proof must be regulated by the sound
discretion of the court" [Donovan v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 845, 852, 155 P.2d 856, 860 (1945), overruled on other grounds,
Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal. 2d 244, 251, 368 P.2d 360, 364, 18 Cal. Rptr.
736, 740 (1962); Booth v. Bond, 56 Cal. App. 2d 153, 155-57, 132 P.2d
520, 522 (1942)]. Subsequently, Section 2042 was superseded by Section
320 of the Evidence Code, which states that "[eJxcept as otherwise pro-
vided by the law, the court in its discretion shall regulate the order of
proof" (emphasis added). Based upon this language, the court in Cook
concluded that the power to order the trial of one issue before others was
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limited to statutory grants of such power [See Cook v. Superior Court, 19
Cal. App. 3d 832, 834, 97 Cal. Rptr. 189, 190 (1971); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§597, 597.5, 598]. Because the issue sought to be tried separately in
Cook involved proofs of damage as well as liability, the court held that to
try that issue first would not be a trial on the issue of "liability" alone, as
required by Section 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure [Cook v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 832, 834, 97 Cal. Rptr. 189, 190 (1971)].
Subsequent to the Cook decision and prior to enactment of Chapter 57,
only the issues of liability in personal injury cases and special defenses,
such as the statute of limitations and other defenses not involving the merits
of the plaintiff's cause of action could be tried separately before others [See
CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1205, §1, at 2705; CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§597,
597.5]. Chapter 57 permits the courts, upon noticed motion and after a
hearing on the motion, to bifurcate and try any issue before any others,
except special defenses, which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597
and 597.5 [CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §598]. Chapter 57 continues to limit the
court's power to grant a motion to bifurcate to those situations in which "the
convenience of witnesses" or the ends of justice would be served [CAL.
Crv. PRoc. CODE §598]. Since Section 598 now closely resembles Rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one might safely conclude
that under California law the circumstances warranting bifurcation-for
"the convenience of witnesses" or to serve "the ends of justice"-would
be at least similar to those in which the federal courts have applied Rule
42(b). The federal courts have frequently ordered severance of issues in
those situations in which such a procedure would avoid inconvenience,
mitigate prejudice, simplify a complex case, or decrease court costs and
delay [Comment, Severance of Issues in Personal Injury Trials: Generally
and in Oregon, 9 WILLAMETrE L.J. 138 (1973)].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 57, Section 598 provided that the court,
on its own motion, could only try the issue of liability before the issue of
damages in a nonjury trial [See CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1205, §1, at 2705].
Chapter 57 expands the court's discretion to bifurcate and try any issue
before others in both jury and nonjury trials, but expressly limits its applica-
tion to situations in which any party to the action has so moved [CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §598]. Thus, it would appear that Chapter 57 has restored some
of the court's inherent power to regulate the sequence of proof at trial.
Chapter 57 is apparently intended to expedite the judicial process and
thereby reduce trial court delay. According to the most recent statistics of
the California Judicial Council, delay from the point at which attorneys first
request a trial date to the date of trial ranges from a year to a year and one-
half in most counties [JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS, pt. 2, at 116
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(1976)]. Although Chapter 57 is no panacea in the area of trial court delay,
based upon the experience of the federal courts with bifurcation of personal
injury cases, one study has indicated that "the overall saving could be
expected to amount to roughly 18 percent of the court's trial time . . .
[which is] equivalent to increasing the number of judges trying those cases
by one-fifth" [Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistic-
alAnalysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1624 (1963). Contra, Note, Separa-
tion of Issues of Liability and Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An
Attempt to Combat Congestion by Rule of Court, 46 IOWA L. REV. 815,
819-20 (1961)]. Although the conclusions of the study apply strictly to
personal injury cases, the authors note that "they should prove applicable
also to other types of cases" [Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time
Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1610 (1963)].
Arguably, a significant savings of time and overall reduction of delay may
be expected from use of Section 598 as amended. In addition, the courts
may be expected to bifurcate issues to simplify complex cases and avoid
possible prejudice occasionally created by extensive joinder of claims
[Note, Separate Trials on Liability and Damges in "Routine Cases": A
Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1962)].
See Generally:
1) 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§124-28 (prior trial of special defenses and
liability) (2d ed. 1971).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE DURING TRIAL §§9.3-.14 (court
control of the order of proof and issues) (1960).
Civil Procedure; best evidence rule
Evidence Code §§255, 260, 1511 (new);
§1500 (amended).
SB 1066 (Wilson); STATS 1977, Ch 708
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 708 amends the "best evidence rule" by deleting the requirement
that "the writing itself" be produced in evidence and declaring instead that
now "no evidence other than the original of a writing is admissible to prove
the content of a writing" [Compare CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 299, §2, at 1350
with CAL. EviD. CODE §1500], if the contents of the writing are at issue
[People v. Marcus, 31 Cal. App. 3d 367, 371, 107 Cal. Rptr. 264, 266
(1973); Hewitt v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 923, 930, 85 Cal. Rptr.
493, 497 (1970)]. Chapter 708 defines an "original" as the writing itself or
any counterpart intended to have the same effect as the original by a person
executing or issuing such a document [CAL. EvID. CODE §255], which is
substantially similar to the definition of an "original" currently contained in
the Federal Rules of Evidence [Compare CAL. EVD. CODE §255 with FED.
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R. EVID. 1001(3)]. Furthermore, both Chapter 708 and the Federal Rules
specify that the "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any
print produced from that negative and that any printout or other readable
output shown to reflect data stored in a computer is also an "original"
[Compare FED. R. EvID. 1001(3) with CAL. EvID. CODE §255].
In addition, Chapter 708 establishes an exception to this "best evidence
rule" in the case of "duplicates," which can be distinguished from "origi-
nals" in that they are counterparts that are not intended to have the same
effect as an original by the party executing or issuing them [See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§255, 260, 1511]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 708,
however, photostatic or photographic copies of a writing were deemed
secondary evidence of the content of a writing and thus, were inadmissible
under the "best evidence rule" without a showing of unavailability of the
original writing [Dugar v. Happy Tiger Records, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 3d 811,
816-18, 116 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415-16 (1974); B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA Evi-
DENCE, Documentary Evidence §707 (2d ed. 1966)], unless such copies
were made and preserved as a part of business records [See CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE §1953i; CAL. EVID. CODE §1550]. This interpretation was consistent
with California's former version of the "best evidence rule," which de-
clared that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, no evidence other
than the writing itself is admissible to prove the content of a writing," [CAL.
STATS. 1965, c. 299, §2, at 1350. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE §§1500-
1510]. In light of the purpose of this rule, which is to guarantee the accuracy
of evidence introduced to establish the content of a writing at issue [See B.
WrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Documentary Evidence §688 (2d ed.
1966)], this interpretation is also consistent with the traditional distrust of
early, unreliable methods of reproduction, such as hand or letterpress
copying [Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 195, 225 (1969)]. Modern
reproduction techniques, such as photographic or photostatic copying, how-
ever, have virtually eliminated the possibility of error [Id.]. As a result,
in 1975 Congress enacted Rule 1003 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
allow such copies to be admissible to the same extent as an original [See
FED. R. EvID. 1001(4), Notes of the Advisory Comm. on Proposed Rules,
note to para. 4].
In order to bring California law into conformity with modern technology,
Chapter 708 now permits a party to have a "duplicate" of a writing
admitted into evidence when: (1) the proponent of such evidence serves
written notice upon each party to the proceeding informing him or her that a
duplicate will be offered in evidence in lieu of the original; (2) the proponent
attaches the duplicate to the notice or describes the writing in the notice and
makes the original or duplicate available to each party for inspection or
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copying when it is inconvenient or impractical to serve a duplicate on each
party; and (3) no party to the proceeding within ten days of being served
with such notice serves the proponent with an objection to the duplicate and
a demand that the original be produced at the hearing [CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1511]. The definition of a "duplicate" provided by Chapter 708 is identi-
cal to the one provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence and includes any
counterpart to the original produced by means of photography or any
equivalent technique that accurately reproduces the original [Compare FED.
R. EvID. 1001(4) with CAL. EVID. CODE §260]. Thus, either as products of
photography or as accurate reproductions, it would appear that in the
absence of a timely objection, Chapter 708 permits the introduction of
photographic or photostatic copies of a writing, the contents of which are at
issue, regardless of whether the copies were made and preserved as a part of
business records [See CAL. EViD. CODE §§260, 1500, 1511]. When the
analogous Federal Rules were first proposed, it was noted that they would
have "the statutory effect of bringing the law into conformity with modern
technology" and would "save time and expense previously wasted on
producing the original when an equally reliable counterpart is at hand"
[Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 195, 226 (1969)]. It would seem that
Chapter 708 could logically be expected to have a similar effect.
See Generally:
1) B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Documentary Evidence §§688-702 (best evidence
rule); §§707-709 (photocopies) (2d ed. 1966), (Supp. 1977).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK §§31.1-.5 (best
evidence rule) (1972), (Supp. 1975).
Civil Procedure; settlement of suits-sliding scale recovery agree-
ments
Code of Civil Procedure §877.5 (new).
AB 1275 (Knox); STATS 1977, Ch 568
Support: California Hospital Association; California Medical Associa-
tion; California Trial Lawyers Association
Code of Civil Procedure Section 877 allows a joint tortfeasor to limit his
or her liability without releasing the other joint tortfeasors from liability by
obtaining a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to
sue or enforce judgment from a plaintiff [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §877(a)].
Furthermore, a joint tortfeasor who obtains such an agreement is discharged
from any liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor [CAL. CrV. PROC.
CODE §877(b)]. As a result of these provisions, in tort cases involving joint
defendants, it is often advantageous to both the plaintiff and one or more,
but not all defendants, to establish a maximum liability for the agreeing
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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defendants [See Thorton & Wick, Loan Receipt Agreements: Are They
Loans, Settlements, Wagering Contracts, or Unholy Alliances?, INS.
COUNSEL J. 226, 226-28 (April 1976)]. The appropriateness of these agree-
ments, commonly called "Mary Carter" agreements [See id. at 226 (de-
rived from the landmark case of Booth v. Mary Carter Paint, Co., 202 So.
2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967)], has recently come under attack [Comment, The
Mary Carter Agreement: Solving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in
Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (1974)]. In an apparent
response to such concern, the legislature has enacted Chapter 568 in an
attempt to prevent the abuse of such agreements in tort liability cases
involving multiple tortfeasors.
The advantages to a plaintiff of a settlement with some, but not all,
defendants are several: (1) there is no release of the other codefendants
unless the settlement expressly provides for such release; (2) there is no
reduction in the potential liability of any nonagreeing defendant; and (3) the
settlement removes the preexisting adversary relationship between the plain-
tiff and the settling defendant [Thornton & Wick, Loan Recept Agreements:
Are They Loans, Settlements, Wagering Contracts, or Unholy Alliances?,
INS. COUNSEL J. 226, 227-28 (April 1976)]. There are also advantages for
one of several codefendants to settle, as the settlement fixes his or her
maximum liability and, depending upon the terms of the agreement and the
outcome of the case, the settling defendant may be obligated for less than
the amount agreed to with the plaintiff [See id. at 228].
Once one defendant settles, however, the remaining defendant(s) may
face several problems: (1) the agreement almost always names the nonsettl-
ing defendant(s) as wholly liable, making disclosure of the complete agree-
ment a hazardous move; (2) the agreement with one defendant diminishes
the chances that another defendant can settle with the plaintiff; and (3) a
settling defendant often will remain in the case, resulting in a "sham" case
by the settling defendant [Id. at 234]. The continuing presence of a defend-
ant who has settled, although not the forthright approach, is most often the
situation [Id. at 232] and may mislead the jury as to how many parties and
even which parties shall share any resulting judgment [See Comment, The
Mary Carter Agreement: Solving the Problems of Collusive Suits in Joint
Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1398-403 (1974)]. On the other
hand, a "Mary Carter" agreement that provides for a settlement agreement
that limits liability of the agreeing defendants to an amount that is dependent
upon the sum ultimately recovered by a plaintiff, may be particularly
vulnerable to abuse if undisclosed to a jury [See Thorton & Wick, Loan
Receipt Agreements: Are They Loans, Settlements, Wagering Contracts,
or Unholy Alliances?, INs. COUNSEL J. 226, 228-30 (April 1976)]. A
settlement limits an alleged tortfeasor's liability without regard to the judi-
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cial determination of fault [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §877], and it would seem
logical that a party defendant agreeing to settle would have an incentive to
give testimony against codefendants if the amount of his or her settlement is
dependent upon the final recovery of the plaintiff. [See Thornton & Wick,
Loan Receipt Agreements: Are They Loans, Settlements, Wagering Con-
tracts, or Unholy Alliances?, INs. COUNSEL J. 226, 228 (April 1976)].
In an apparent response to the problems associated with these sliding
scale recovery agreements, the legislature has enacted Chapter 568 to add
Section 877.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 877.5 applies only
when there is an agreement between the plaintiff(s) and one or more, but not
all, alleged defendant tortfeasors and the agreement is based upon a sliding
scale of recovery. [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §8775(a)]. Chapter 568 defines
these sliding scale recovery agreements as agreements that limit the liability
of an agreeing defendant to an amount that is dependent upon the sum
recovered by the plaintiff from the nonagreeing parties [CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §877.5(b)]. Pursuant to Chapter 568, the existence of such an agree-
ment requires the parties entering into the pact to inform the court of its
existence and terms [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §877.5(a)(1)]. Furthermore, if
the action is tried before a jury and a defendant who has agreed to a sliding
scale recovery agreement is called as a witness, the court must, upon
motion of any party, disclose to the jury the existence of the agreement and
its contents unless the court determines that disclosure will result in undue
prejudice or will confuse or mislead the jury [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE
§877.5(a)(2)]. The existence of a sliding scale recovery agreement, howev-
er, may be disclosed only to the extent that is necessary to allow the jury to
understand the essential nature of the agreement without disclosing any
monetary terms or contingencies and to allow the jury to understand that the
agreement may bias the testimony of the alleged tortfeasor-witness who
entered into the agreement [CAL. Civ. PFROC. CODE §877.5(a)(2)].
A "Mary Carter" agreement often results in an unfair surprise to the
nonagreeing defendant, and may destroy his or her case if the defense is at
all based upon anticipated attempts by codefendants to avoid liability [Com-
ment, The Mary Carter Agreement: Solving the Problems of Collusive
Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1402 (1974)].
Thus, with prejudgment settlements becoming more prominent [See King,
Thumbs in the Dike: Procedures to Contain the Flood of Personal Injury
Cases, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 223, 223 (1970)], the provisions of Chapter
568 that require disclosure of sliding scale recovery agreements when a
defendant party to the action is a witness, will apparently provide greater
protection to nonagreeing defendants in an action involving joint tortfeasors.
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See Generally:
1) Thorton & Wick, Loan Recept Agreements: Are They Loans, Settlements, Wagering
Contracts, or Unholy Alliances?, INS. COUNSEL J. 226 (April 1976).
2) Comment, Settlement Devices with Joint Tortfeasors, 25 FLA. L. REV. 762, 772-78 (1973).
Civil Procedure; attorney fees in public interest litigation
Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5 (new).
AB 1310 (Berman); STATS 1977, Ch 1197
Support: California Rural League Assistance; State Bar of California
Opposition: California Association of Realtors; League of California
Cities
Under existing law the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys is
left to the agreement between attorney and client unless specifically au-
thorized by statute [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021]. Consistent with this
law, the legislature on several previous occasions has created specific
statutory exceptions to the general rule of Section 1021 by allowing attorney
fee shifting in areas including workers' compensation [See CAL. LAB. CODE
§§4651.3, 5410.1] and shareholder derivative actions [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §800(d)]. Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as added by
Chapter 1197, now empowers California courts, upon motion of the prevail-
ing party, to award reasonable attorneys' fees to this party in an action that
serves to enforce a right affecting the public interest. The award is permis-
sible if: (1) a significant benefit is conferred upon the general public or a
large class of persons by the prosecution of the action; (2) the award is
appropriate in light of the necessity and financial burden of enforcing the
right involved; and (3) such fees should not, in the interest of justice, be
paid out of any recovery. Chapter 1197 limits recoveries of attorneys' fees
in actions involving public entities by denying such an award to a prevailing
public entity [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.5].
COMMENT
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case of
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society [421 U.S. 240 (1975)]
that reversed an apparent trend in the federal court system under which
attorneys' fees had been awarded to successful plaintiffs who prosecuted
public interests suits and were thus said to be acting as "private attorneys
general" [See id. at 270-71 n.46 (1975). See generally Hoitt v. Vitek, 495
F.2d 219, 220-21 (1st Cir. 1974); Cornish v. Richland Parish School Bd.,
495 F.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598,
606 (5th Cir. 1974)]. In Alyeska the Court declared that the "American
Rule", recognized in Arcambel v. Wiseman [3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306
(1796)], precluded the allowance of attorneys' fees in federal courts [See
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Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50
(1975)]. The "American Rule" proscribes the inclusion of attorneys' fees
as an element of damages or costs, and has been said to stem from the early
American belief that attorneys were not essential to a legal system based on
easily manipulable rules [See Gctodhard, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 873
(1929)]. Recognizing that permissible judicial exceptions had developed in
which the court could award fees in limited situations, as when the plaintiff
recovers a common fund on behalf of others [Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 257] and when the loser either acts in
willful disobedience to a court order or in bad faith [Id. at 258], the Court
held that Congress had preempted the capacity to shift fees in actions based
upon statutory law by explicitly directing payment of such fees only when it
deemed such action desirable, as in antitrust actions [Id. at 261-62]. Finally,
the Court cited Section 1920 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which
lists permissible taxing of court costs, and Section 1923(a) of Title 28 of the
United States Code, which lists docket fees and costs of briefs that may also
be taxed as costs, as precluding such awards at law in the absence of express
statutory authority [See id. at 255-57].
Although state courts do not appear to be expressly bound by the Alyeska
decision, there has been speculation that, due to the similar developmental
structure of California law, Alyeska may have a substantial chilling effect
upon the development of a state doctrine recognizing the private attorney
general concept as a permissible basis for fee shifting in California [See
Comment, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 267, 319 (1976)]. The speculation as to the possible
"chilling" effect of Alyeska rests upon the facts that California also has a
preclusionary statute similar to the federal law [See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§1021], and has judicially allowed fee shifting in specific situations [See,
e.g., Williams v. MacDougall, 39 Cal. 80, 85 (1870) (obstinate defendant);
Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 323, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146,
152 (1968) (substantial benefit theory); Hornaday v. Hornaday, 95 Cal.
App. 2d 384, 394, 213 P.2d 91, 98 (1949) (common fund)]. Furthermore,
the California Supreme Court has neither adopted nor rejected the private
attorney general theory [See D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11
Cal. 3d 1, 27, 520 P.2d 10, 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 805 (1974)] and may,
therefore, be influenced by the Alyeska reasoning. This failure to act has, in
at least two cases, caused lower courts to refuse to grant attorney fees on the
private attorney general rationale [See Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d
596, 620, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 261 (1976); People ex. rel. Department of
Public Works v. Basio, 47 Cal. App. 3d 495, 532, 121 Cal. Rptr. 375, 397
(1975)].
By adopting Chapter 1197, the legislature arguably intends to establish
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statutorily the concept of fee shifting in public interest litigation in the
California courts, rather than risk a state supreme court refusal to create a
viable judicial exception in the area. Not only will the enactment of Chapter
1197 place California in the forefront on this issue [See Note, Attorney's
Fees-Public Interest Law-Beyond Alyeska: Creating a Workable Private
Attorney General Exception, 51 WASH. L. REv. 1047, 1064-65 (1975-76)
(speculating on the future course of various state courts and legislatures)],
but, according to express language in Alyeska, it will also permit applica-
tion of the concept by federal courts hearing cases in California based upon
diversity jurisdiction [Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975)].
See Generally:
1) 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, §116 (bases of award of attorneys' fees), §§125-128
(statutory fee shifting) (2d ed. 1971).
2) Mathis, Requesting Court Awarded Attorney's Fees in the Absence of Statutory Authoriza-
tion, 49 Wis. B. BULL. 39 (Oct. 1976).
3) Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L.R. 636 (1973-74).
Civil Procedure; costs of expert witnesses-settlement offers
Code of Civil Procedure §998 (amended).
SB 172 (Song); STATS 1977, Ch 458
Support: State Bar of California
Opposition: California Dental Association
Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure delineates the procedures for
making a settlement offer in a civil action and permits a defendant or
plaintiff whose offer to settle before trial is not accepted to recover certain
costs if the opposing party fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than the
settlement offer [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §998(c)-(d)]. The purpose of
Section 998 and similar provisions such as Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is apparently "to induce or influence a party to settle
litigation and obviate the necessity of trial" [Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate
Plastic Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607, 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); see CONTINU-
ING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
§ 14.9 (1977)]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 458, however, if a plaintiff
did not accept a settlement offer in any proceeding other than an eminent
domain action, or if a defendant did not accept such an offer in any action,
then such a party could have been required to pay, in addition to other costs,
a reasonable sum to cover only those expert witness costs that were actually
incurred and reasonably necessary in the preparation of the case for trial
[See CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1679, §3, at 3605. See generally CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (settlement offers in eminent domain proceedings)].
Chapter 458 amends Section 998 to now permit the recovery of costs
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incurred for the services of expert witnesses during trial, as well as those
costs incurred for such services in preparation for trial, provided, as in the
past, that these expert witnesses are not in the employ of any party to the
action [Compare CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1679, §3, at 3605 with CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §998(c)-(d)]. Chapter 458 also provides that the compensation
for expert witnesses that may be paid pursuant to this section is now limited
to the costs specified in Section 68092.5 of the Government Code, which
delineates the recoverable costs for expert witnesses required to appear in
court or at a deposition [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §998(g)]. Section 68092.5
indicates that an expert witness is to receive "reasonable compensation for
his entire time," including travel time and the time for which he or she is
required to remain in the place of trial or deposition pursuant to subpoena
[CAL. Gov'T CODE §68092.5(a)], or a sum that was stipulated in an express
contract between the witness and a party to the suit [CAL. Gov'T CODE
§68092.5(c)]. Thus, by permitting the recovery of expert witness costs that
are incurred during both trial preparation and the trial itself from a party who
falls to receive a more favorable judgment than the offered settlement,
Chapter 458 arguably furthers the purpose of Section 998 by encouraging
pretrial settlement of suits.
See Generally:
1) 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Proceedings Without Trial §§40-42 (settlement
offers) (2d ed. 1971), (Supp. 1971).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §14.9
(settlement offers) (1977).
Civil Procedure; amendment of money judgments
Code of Civil Procedure §85 (amended).
AB 439 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 71
Support: Western Center on Law and Poverty
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 71, justice and municipal courts appar-
ently had no express authority to amend the terms and conditions of a
previous money judgment to provide for payment in installments [See CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1288, §4, at - ]. Consequently, despite the fact that the
law apparently permits a court to amend and control its process and orders to
make them conform to the law and justice [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128(8)],
some courts have been reluctant to amend the terms and conditions of a
money judgment in this manner [Memorandum from Western Center on
Law and Poverty to Senate Committee on the Judiciary (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal)].
Chapter 71 now permits municipal and justice courts to amend the terms
and conditions for payment of a judgment at any time to provide for
installment payments [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §85]. These courts, however,
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may only amend the payment terms of a judgment in this manner upon
noticed motion of a party who can show "good cause" for such an amend-
ment [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §85]. Similar statutes in other jurisdictions
require the court to take into consideration the reasonable requirements of
the judgment debtor and his or her family when the court is fixing the
amount of the installment payment [See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§600.6107, .6201, .6221; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§5226, 5240 (McKin-
ney)]. Thus, "good cause" would appear to include at least those situations
in which such an amendment is necessary to enable debtors to meet their
reasonable requirements and those of their families [Compare CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §85 with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§600.6107, .6201, .6221
and N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§5226, 5240 (McKinney)]. Furthermore, if
good cause is shown, Section 85 permits the amending of a judgment to
provide for installment payments without regard to the nature of the underly-
ing debt or whether the moving party appeared before entry of such judg-
ment or order.
See Generally:
1) 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 212 (payment of judg-
ments) (1975).
Civil Procedure; enforcement of sister state money-judgments-
interest and costs
Code of Civil Procedure §§1710.15, 1710.25, 1710.30, 1710.40
(amended).
AB 85 (McAlister); STATS 1977, Ch 232
Support: California Law Revision Commission
California law provides an expeditious registration procedure for enforc-
ing sister state money judgments in California [See CAL. CfV. PROC. CODE
§§1710.10-.65; Recommendation Relating to Sister State Money Judg-
ments, 13 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUDIES 1671, 1673 (1976)]. This procedure offers a judgment creditor the
opportunity to obtain a California judgment by registering his or her sister
state judgment with the specified superior court, and thus avoiding the
necessity of bringing a completely independent action [See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §1710.60(a); 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATION 207, 210 (1975)]. This registration process, however, did not
include the interest on a sister state judgment or the costs of completing the
judgment registration procedure as part of the California judgment [See
Recommendation Relating to Sister State Money Judgments, 13 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1671, 1673-
74 (1976)]. As a result, if a judgment creditor wished to obtain the accrued
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interest on a sister state judgment under the prior law, a court hearing was
apparently required to determine the applicable rate, except when the rate
was stated in the sister state judgment [See id. at 1673]. At these hearings,
there was no ceiling placed on the rate used to compute accrued interest;
rather, the court in all cases simply employed the interest rate of the state in
which the initial judgment had been rendered [See Knight v. Barnes, 182 F.
Supp. 383, 384 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Parnham v. Parnham, 32 Cal. App. 2d
93, 98, 89 P.2d 189, 192 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §101 (1971)]. The original California sister state judgment registra-
tion procedure failed to include recovery of accrued interest and costs
apparently because it was modeled after the 1964 version of the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 [See UNIFORM ENFORCE-
MENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT §§1-10 (1964 version); Feldman, Sister
State and Foreign Money-Judgments Act of 1974, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 483,
483 (1975)], which deleted these provisions from the original version
[Compare UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT §14 (1948
version) with UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT §§1-10
(1964 version)].
Chapter 232 now permits a judgment creditor to obtain the interest
accrued on a sister state money judgment by including in the registration
application, inter alia, a statement of the rate of interest applicable to the
judgment under the law of the sister state, a citation to the law of the sister
state establishing such a rate, and the amount of interest accrued on the sister
state judgment [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1710.15(b)(3)]. The amount of
this accrued interest is still computed using the sister state's rate of interest,
but now only to the extent that this rate does not exceed seven percent per
annum [See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§1710.15(b)(3), .25(a)(2)], which is
the rate of interest applicable to judgments rendered in California [See CAL.
CONST. art. XV, §1]. After the entry of a California judgment, the amount
of interest accrued is computed at the rate seven percent per annum [CAL.
CIrv. PROC. CODE §1710.25(b)].
In addition, Section 1710.40, as amended by Chapter 232, now provides
that when the amount of interest accrued on a sister state judgment entered
in California is incorrectly stated, a judgment debtor may move to vacate the
California judgment [CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §1710.40(a), (b)]. After a
hearing on such a motion, a court may either vacate, modify, or affirm the
judgment as entered, and must, if requested by one of the parties, file its
findings on the motion in writing, unless the amount of the sister state
judgment entered is $1,000 or less [See CAL. Crv. PROc. CODE
§1710.40(c)].
In addition to the amount of interest accrued on a sister state judgment, a
judgment creditor may now recover the fee paid to file the application for
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entry of such judgment [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1710.25(a)(3)] and the fee
charged for serving notice of entry of the sister state judgment in California,
provided this service fee does not exceed the amount allowed to public
officers or employees in this state for such service [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§1710.30(b)]. The filing fee may be recovered by simply including the
amount of this fee in the judgment registration application [See CAL. CrV.
PROC. CODE §1710.25(a)(3)]. To recover the fee for service of the notice of
entry of judgment, however, a judgment creditor must follow the fee
recovery procedures established by Section 1033.7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure [CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE §1710.30(b)]. This procedure requires
that a judgment creditor file a verified memorandum of the service fee and
serve a copy of this memorandum on the judgment debtor not more than six
months after the fee has been paid [CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §1033.7]. If the
debtor falls to challenge the memorandum within ten days of receipt of the
copy or the court finds such a challenge to be invalid, the clerk of the court
must enter the amount of the fee in the margin of the judgment and this
amount must thereafter be included in any writ of execution issued upon that
judgment [CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §1033.7]. In summary, Chapter 232
codifies the right of judgment creditors to recover accrued interest and costs
by incorporating the necessary recovery procedures into California's ex-
peditious sister state judgment registration process, and facilitates the
prompt and equitable treatment of all sister state money judgments sought to
be entered in this state.
See Generally:
I) 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Enforcement of Judgement §§195A-E (enforcement
of sister state money judgments) (Supp. 1977).
2) 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 207 (enforcement of
sister state money judgments) (1975).
3) Recommendation Relating to Enforcement of Sister State Money Judgments, 11 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 451 (1973).
Civil Procedure; levy and execution
Code of Civil Procedure §§682a, 683 (amended).
AB 308 (McVittie); STATS 1977, Ch 42
Support: State Bar of California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 42, a judgment creditor was required to
post a bond in an amount not less than twice the amount of the judgment in
order to levy an execution upon specified personal property [CAL. STATS.
1974, c. 1516, §13, at 3377]. Section 682a, as amended by Chapter 42, now
permits the posting of a smaller bond when the amount sought to be reached
by such a levy is less than the amount of the judgment [See STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 11-22]. Under these circum-
stances a bond equal to "twice the amount sought to be reached by the
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levy" is all that is now required to levy upon a safe deposit box, a bank or
savings and loan account, a savings and loan share, or an investment
certificate, none of which are solely in the name of the judgment debtor
[CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §682a]. Chapter 42 was apparently enacted in
response to the many instances in which judgment creditors wished to levy
on a bank account or on items in a safety deposit box that were of relatively
little value when compared with the amount of the judgment, but were
deterred from doing so because of the expense of obtaining a bond that was
twice the amount of the judgment [STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CON-
FERENCE RESOLUTION 11-22].
Prior to enactment of Chapter 42, the law apparently permitted an alias
return, i.e., the redelivery of a writ of execution to permit the receipt of
proceeds acquired after the return of the writ, only when a sale under a writ
of execution was not completed before the return of the writ [CAL. STATS.
1974, c. 1251, §2, at 2705]. When a levying officer, however, received
proceeds from a levy of execution after he or she had returned the writ of
execution unsatisfied, a new writ had to be issued before the officer could
levy such proceeds and return them to the court [See CAL. STATS. 1974, c.
1251, §2, at 2705; Partch v. Adams, 55 Cal. App. 2d 1, 11, 130 P.2d 244,
250 (1942)]. This procedure involved additional court costs and administra-
tive measures to issue these new writs, plus an additional fee for the new
writ, which was charged to the judgment creditor [STATE BAR OF CALIFOR-
NIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 11-19]. With respect to the require-
ment that a new writ be obtained after the original writ was returned
unsatisfied, the prior law was arguably vague since it provided that the
levying officer may make "an alias return of the proceedings of a sale or
levy" [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §683 (emphasis added); CONTINUING EDUCA-
TION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE §17.34 (alias
and pluries writs) (1968)]. Chapter 42 has apparently been adopted to clarify
this ambiguity and to alleviate the waste that is involved in issuing a new
writ [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 11-
19]. The law now permits the clerk to redeliver the original writ so that a
levying officer may make an alias return of after-acquired proceeds without
the necessity of issuing a new writ [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §683]. Thus,
Chapter 42 would appear to reduce the cost of levying upon bank accounts
or the contents of safe deposit boxes and to facilitate delivery of the
proceeds from a writ of execution when such proceeds are acquired by a
levying officer after the return of the writ.
See Generally:
1) 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §72 (time of levy and
return) (2d ed. 1971).
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Civil Procedure; levy of execution-keepers
Code of Civil Procedure §688 (amended).
AB 1007 (McAlister); STATS 1977, Ch 155
(Effective June 29, 1977)
Support: California Law Revision Commission
Prior to enactment of Chapter 155 and the new Attachment Law [See
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§481.010-493.060], Section 688 of the Code of
Civil Procedure provided that tangible personal property in the hands of the
judgment debtor was to be levied upon in the same manner that such
property was attached [CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523, §6.5, at 3069]. As a
result, the levying officer was required to levy upon personal property used
as a dwelling, such as a housetrailer, mobilehome, or boat by placing a
keeper in charge of the property for at least two days [See CAL. STATS.
1970, c. 1523, §§ 4, 6.5, at 3064, 3069]. Furthermore, whenever a levy was
made on personal property (other than money, or a vehicle required to be
registered under the Vehicle Code, belonging to a going concern) the
levying officer was similarly required to place a keeper in charge of the
property for at least two days, if the judgment debtor consented [See CAL.
STATS. 1970, c. 1523, §§4, 6.5 at 3064, 3069]. During that period, the
judgment debtor was permitted to operate his or her business with the
proceeds from all sales going to the keeper for the purpose of satisfying the
levy [See CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523, §§4, 6.5, at 3064, 3069].
When the new Attachment Law became operative on January 1, 1977,
Section 688 was revised to require that tangible property in the possession of
the judgment debtor be levied upon in the manner provided by Section
488.320 of the Code of Civil Procedure [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 437, §46, at
-]. Section 488.320 directs the levying officer to attach tangible personal
property by taking it into custody, except as otherwise provided by Article 2
(commencing with Section 488.310 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 488.045 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the manner for
taking such property into custody by stating that "where a levying officer is
directed to take property into custody, he may do so either by removing the
property to a place of safekeeping or by installing a keeper," apparently at
the levying officer's discretion. A third section of the Attachment Law,
which is an exception to the procedure set out in Section 488.320, permits a
levying officer to place, for a period not to exceed ten days, a keeper in
charge of the inventory of a going concern or of farm products pursuant to a
writ of attachment, but this section is not incorporated by direct reference in
Section 688 [See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§488.320, .360]. Thus,
narrowly construed, neither Section 488.045 nor Section 488.320 expressly
requires that the levying officer place a keeper in charge of the property
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[Recommendation Relating to Use of Keepers Pursuant to Writs of Execu-
tion, 14 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUDIES -, - (1978)]. Liberally construed, however, the law could have
been interpreted to permit the use of a keeper for a period not to exceed ten
days when levying upon the inventory of a going concern or upon farm
products [Id. at -; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §488.360].
To resolve these interpretive problems and to achieve some uniformity in
the use of keepers in the levy process, Section 688 has been amended by
Chapter 155 and now contains no reference to Section 488.320 [See CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE §688(b), (c)]. Instead, Section 688(c) now specifies the
manner in which tangible personal property in the possession of a judgment
debtor is to be levied upon. When directed to do so, a levying officer may
now take such property into custody by removing the property to a place of
safekeeping or by installing a keeper at the officer's discretion [See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §688(c)]. In the case of personal property used as a
dwelling, however, levying officers are once again required to levy upon
such property by placing a keeper in charge of the property at the judgment
creditor's expense while permitting the judgment debtor to remain in posses-
sion for at least two days [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §688(c)]. Similarly, the
law provides that if a judgment debtor consents, a levying officer must levy
upon personal property of a going business (other than money or a vehicle
required to be registered under the vehicle code) by placing a keeper in charge
of the property at the judgment creditor's expense for at least two days [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §688(c)]. During that period the judgment debtor is
permitted to continue to operate the business at his or her expense, with the
proceeds from all sales going to the keeper for the purpose of satisfying the
levy, unless otherwise authorized by the judgment creditor [See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §688(c)].
The elimination of the use of keepers, which resulted from a narrow
interpretation of the levy procedures prior to enactment of Chapter 155,
apparently deprived judgment debtors of a grace period during which an
arrangement preferable to the levy procedure might have been agreed upon
by the parties [Recommendation Relating to Use of Keepers Pursuant to
Writs of Execution 14 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND STUDIES -, - (1978)]. A broad interpretation of this
prior law, which permitted a levy by the use of a keeper for a lengthy period
of time, was also undesirable because of the considerable expense involved
[Id. at - ]. Thus, Chapter 155 appears to avoid these undesirable results by
providing for a limited grace period during which keepers are placed in
charge of certain personal property while judgment debtors are allowed to
remain in possession of that property and, if the levy is upon personal
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
Civil Procedure
property of a going business, are permitted to continue to operate the
business.
See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §§163, 172, 173 (levy keep-
ers) (2d ed. 1970); §§345A, 361A (levy keepers) (Supp. 1977).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE §§9.55-
.60 (levy keepers) (1968).
Civil Procedure; execution on dwelling houses
Code of Civil Procedure §§683, 690, 690.31, 690.50, 690.51, 690.52
(amended); Financial Code §864 (amended).
AB 423 (Kapiloff); STATS 1977, Ch 305
(Effective July 8, 1977)
Support: Western Center on Law and Poverty
Chapter 305 enacts a variety of changes in the law relating to execution on
dwelling houses. Dwelling houses in which debtors and their families
actually reside are exempt from execution in the same amount as a home-
stead claim, which is currently limited to $30,000 [See CAL. CIV. CODE
§1260; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(a)], except when: (1) the debtor has
an existing declared homestead; (2) an encumbrance is given the force and
effect of a judgment lien; or (3) the execution or forced sale sought is in
satisfaction of judgments obtained on debts secured by mechanics' liens and
encumbrances [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(b)]. Prior to the enact-
ment of Chapter 305, the law provided that when an action seeking a writ of
execution on a dwelling house was pending in a municipal or justice court, if
the judgment creditor alleged that the current value of the dwelling house in
question, less any liens and encumbrances on the property, exceeded the
allowable exemption and did not allege the applicability of one of the
aforementioned exceptions, the court was required to transfer further pro-
ceedings to the superior court [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §4, at -].
In addition, if the municipal or justice court determined that a writ of
execution may only issue if the current value, less any liens and encumbr-
ances, exceeded the allowable exemption, then the court was again required
to transfer further proceedings to the superior court [See CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 1000, §4, at -]. The law now empowers the court to which the judgment
creditor applied for the writ of execution to determine whether the current
value of the dwelling house, less any liens and encumbrances, exceeds the
amount of the allowable exemption [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§690.31 (c)]. Furthermore, Chapter 305 now requires that when a judgment
creditor is seeking a writ of execution on a dwelling house based upon a
judgment rendered in another county, he or she must pay a filing fee of four
dollars ($4) when filing in a justice court or six dollars ($6) when filing in a
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superior or municipal court [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(c)].
Formerly, the notices required in connection with execution on dwelling
houses were served in the manner prescribed for giving notice of the sale of
real property under a writ of execution in Section 692 of the Code of Civil
Procedure [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §4, at -. Consequently,
service of such notices apparently had to be made by all of the following
methods: (1) by posting a notice particularly describing the property in one
public place in the city or judicial district where the property was to be
executed upon; (2) by publishing the notice in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city, judicial district, or county where the property was to
be executed upon; and (3) by mailing the notice by certified mail to the
judgment debtor at his or her business or last known home address or by
delivering such notice to the judgment debtor [See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§692; CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §4, at -]. Service was arguably required
to be made at least 20 days prior to the hearing held to determine if cause to
issue a writ of execution is lacking [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §692; CAL.
SThTS. 1976, c. 1000, §4, at -]. Chapter 305 now provides that notice of a
hearing concerning the issuance of a writ of execution on a dwelling house
or notice of the issuance of the writ itself if the judgment debtor or his or her
representative did not appear at the hearing, must be mailed by first-class
mail by the levying officer to the judgment debtor and any third party in
whose name the property stands according to the county tax assessor's
records [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§690.31(d), .31(g), .31(l)]. This
notice and copies of the prescribed documents must be mailed to the
designated parties no less than ten days prior to the date of the hearing or the
sale of the property as appropriate [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §690.31(1)]. In
addition, the levying officer is required to personally serve copies of such
notices on the occupant of a dwelling or any person of suitable age and
discretion found upon the property who is either an employee, an agent, or a
member of the family or household of the occupant [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§690.31(l)]. If no occupant is present at the time of service, the levying
officer must post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises
[CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(l)]. Furthermore, the hearing and writ of
execution notices that are mailed to judgment debtors must now include the
statement that "If you are a tenant and do nor claim to be the owner or
buyer of this property, this notice does not affect you, please give it to your
landlord" [Compare CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§690.31(d), .31(g) with
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §4, at -]. These provisions will apparently
insure that judgment debtors receive the prescribed notice of the hearing and
execution and avoid the unnecessary legal expenses that an unwitting tenant
or third party might incur as a result of the belief that they had a right to
object to such actions.
Chapter 305 also amends the procedure for claiming exemptions from
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execution on a dwelling house by bringing the deadlines for claiming such
exemptions into conformity with the deadlines prescribed for claiming
exemptions from execution on all other property [Compare CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 437, §47, at - with CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§690.235, 690.50].
Therefore, even when execution is made on a dwelling house, a debtor must
deliver an affidavit claiming an exemption from execution to the levying
officer within ten days after such property has been levied upon [CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §690.50(a)]. Similarly, a creditor desiring to contest an exemp-
tion on a dwelling house or any other property must now file a counteraf-
fidavit within five days of receiving a copy of the exemption [CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE §§690.50(b), .50(c)]. The various changes made by Chapter
305 in the procedure for executing on and exempting dwelling houses
reduce administrative waste involved in transferring cases from one court to
another, provide better notice to the affected parties, and prescribe a uni-
form procedure for claiming an exemption to execution on all property.
See Generally:
1) 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §49C (dwelling house
exemption) (Supp. 1977).
2) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 226 (dwelling house
exemption) (1977).
Civil Procedure; lien termination
Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 13 (commencing with §493.010) (new).
SB 221 (Zenovich); STATS 1977, Ch 499
Support: California Law Revision Commission, Credit Managers Associ-
ation of Southern California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 499 and the new Attachment Law [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§481.010-492.090], former Section 542b of the Code of
Civil Procedure provided that the lien of a temporary restraining order
obtained in connection with a prejudgment attachment automatically ter-
minated upon either a defendant's filing of a petition in bankruptcy or
making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors [See CAL.
STATS. 1972, c. 550, §§9, 19, at 944-45, 950]. When the new Attachment
Law was enacted, it replaced the temporary restraining order with a tempo-
rary protective order [6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATION 198 (1975)], but did not continue these automatic lien termina-
tion provisions [Recommendation Relating to the Attachment Law-Effect
of Bankruptcy Proceedings; Effect of General Assignments for the Benefit of
Creditors, 14 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND STUDIES -, - (1978) (hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATIONS)].
Thus, prior to the enactment of Chapter 499, a trustee in bankruptcy had to
initiate proceedings to void an attachment lien under the Federal Bankruptcy
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Act [11 U.S.C. §§1-1103 (1970)] [RECOMMENDATIONS at -], which pro-
vides that every lien against the property of a debtor obtained by any legal or
equitable process within four months before the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy will be deemed void if the debtor was insolvent at the time the
lien was obtained or the lien was fraudulently sought or granted [11 U.S.C.
§107(a)(1) (1970)]. By contrast, after the Attachment Law became opera-
tive on January 1, 1977, creditors to whose benefit a general assignment
inured were left with no means to effect the termination of such a lien [See
RECOMMENDATIONS at -], and thus, could only reach property subject to an
attachment lien if they could proceed in bankruptcy [See 11 U.S.C. §95(b)
(1970); RECOMMENDATIONS at -].
Chapter 499 now provides that the filing of a petition initiating bankrupt-
cy proceedings terminates not only a lien created by a temporary protective
order, but also a lien created by a prejudgment attachment, if the lien was
created by either process within four months prior to the filing of the petition
and the bankruptcy court has not ordered the lien preserved for the benefit of
the bankrupt [See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §493.030(b)]. Although similar to
the provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act that permits such liens to be
declared void, Chapter 499 does not require a showing that the debtor was
insolvent at the time the lien was obtained [Compare 11 U.S.C. §107(a)(1)
(1970) with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.030(b)]. This requirement was
apparently omitted because in many instances it is most difficult to prove
insolvency on a given date prior to bankruptcy [See Inland Security Co.,
Inc. v. Estate of Kishner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 345 (W.D. Mo. 1974)].
In addition, Chapter 499 provides that a general assignment for the
benefit of creditors terminates both a lien created by a temporary protective
order and a lien created by a prejudgment attachment, if the lien was created
by either process within four months prior to the making of the general
assignment [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.030(a)]. An assignment for
the benefit of creditors is a transfer of a debtor's assets to a third party
assignee who acts as trustee for the assigned property and immediately
converts such property and distributes the proceeds ratably among the
creditors [Jarvis v. Webber, 196 Cal. 86, 98, 236 P. 138, 143 (1925);
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY AND WAGE
EARNER PLANS §1.7 (1971). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§3448-3473
(assignments for the benefit of creditors)]. In addition, as used in Chapter
499, a "general assignment for the benefit of creditors" is: (1) an assign-
ment of all of a defendant's assets that are transferrable and not exempt from
execution; (2) an assignment for the benefit of all of a defendant's creditors;
and (3) an assignment that does not itself create a preference of one creditor
or class of creditors over any other creditor or class of creditors [CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §493.010]. Furthermore, Chapter 499 provides that the assig-
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nee of a "general assignment for the benefit of creditors" is now subrogated
to the rights of the plaintiff under the temporary protective order or attach-
ment [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.060]. The Law Revision Commission
indicates that this provision is intended to prevent the termination of the lien
of the temporary protective order or prejudgment attachment from bene-
fiting a lienholder whose lien was subordinate to the plaintiff's lien but was
not terminated by the general assignment [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.060,
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N COMMENT]. In the absence of this provision, a
secured party whose interest would otherwise be prior to the interest of the
assignee of such an assignment would move up in the line of priorities and,
as a result, the termination of the attachment would benefit the secured party
and not the entire group of the defendant's creditors as was intended [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §493.060, CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N COMMENT]. The
effect of this provision is analogous to that of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provides that any property affected by a lien deemed void will pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy or the debtor [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §493.060, CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM'N COMMENT. See generally 11 U.S.C. §107(a)(3)
(1970)]. Chapter 499, however, indicates that there is to be no termination
of any attachment lien in California unless all attachment liens on the
defendant's property located in other states that were created within four
months prior to the making of a general assignment or the filing of a petition
initiating bankruptcy proceedings have also terminated under the laws of the
other states [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.030(c); see CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §493.030, CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N COMMENTS].
When the lien created by a prejudgment attachment is terminated by
either the filing of a petition initiating bankruptcy proceedings or a "general
assignment for the benefit of creditors," Chapter 499 prescribes the proce-
dure that must be followed in order to secure the release of the attachment
[See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.040]. In the case of a bankruptcy, the
trustee, receiver, or debtor if there is no trustee or receiver, may secure the
release of the attachment by filing a request for the release of the attachment
with the levying officer stating the grounds for release and describing the
property to be released [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.040(a)]. This request
must be executed under oath and must be accompanied by an additional
copy of the request [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §493.040(a)], and a certified
and an additional copy of the petition in bankruptcy [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§493.040(c)]. The assignee under a "general assignment for the benefit of
creditors" may secure such a release by filing a request in the same manner
[CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.040(a)], and by additionally providing two
copies of the general assignment [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §493.040(b)].
If the immediate release of a prejudgment attachment is sought, the party
making such a request must post an undertaking in the amount of the
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plaintiff's claim secured by the attachment in order to compensate the
plaintiff for any damages that may result from a release of attachment that is
later found to have been improper [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.040(d)]. If
such an undertaking has been given, the levying officer must immediately
release the attachment upon receipt of the request [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§493.040(f)]. The levying officer must also notify the plaintiff of the release
within five days of the receipt of the request for a release [CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §493.040(e)]. If such an undertaking has not been given, the levying
officer must release the attachment ten days after the date on which notice of
this proposed release is mailed to the plaintiff [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§493.040(e)-(f)]. This notice must contain a copy of the request for release
of the attachment and a copy of either the petition in bankruptcy or the
general assignment for the benefit of creditors that provided the basis for the
release [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§493.040(b), .040(c), .040(e)(1)]. Further-
more, Chapter 499 provides that when the attached property has been taken
into custody, it must be released to the person who requested the release of
attachment or some other person designated in the request [CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §493.040(g)]. If, however, the attached property has not been taken
into custody, the levying officer must release the attachment by notifying
the defendant that the attachment has been released and by recording such a
release in the office at which the writ of attachment was originally filed [See
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§488.560, 493.040(g)].
When the lien of a temporary protective order or of a prejudgment
attachment has been terminated under these new provisions, Chapter 499
provides that the lien may be reinstated with its previous effect if: (1) the
termination was the result of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors
and the assignment is set aside for a reason other than the filing of a
bankruptcy proceeding; (2) the termination resulted from the filing of a
petition initiating a bankruptcy proceeding and the defendant is not finally
adjudged bankrupt and no arrangement is proposed and confirmed; or (3)
the termination was the result of filing a petition initiating bankruptcy
proceedings and the trustee abandons the property that had been subject to
the lien [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.050(a)]. Section 493.050 further
provides for the tolling of the running of the effective periods of temporary
protective orders and liens of attachment when a defendant terminates the
liens on these protective orders or attachments by making a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §493.050(b); cf.
Booloodian v. Ohanesian, 13 Cal. App. 3d 635, 639-40, 91 Cal. Rptr. 923,
926 (1970) (tolling of the period of attachment lien under former Section
542b)]. The Federal Law provides for the tolling of similar state statutes of
limitation upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy [See 11 U.S.C. §29(f)
(1970)]. In addition, Chapter 499 insulates the levying officer from liability
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for releasing an attachment in accordance with its provisions and also
creates immunity for all others acting in conformity with such a release
[CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §493.040(h)]. Thus, the Law Revision Commission
has indicated that by enacting the procedures set forth in Chapter 499 that
permit the automatic termination of the liens of temporary protective orders
and attachments under specified conditions, the legislature has furthered the
state policy "favoring procedures generally designed to distribute [a]...
debtor's assets ratably and also eliminates the need for proceedings in
bankruptcy to obtain an order declaring such liens void [RECOMMENDATIONS
at-].
See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §187 (effect of bankruptcy
on liens) (2d ed. 1970).
2) 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §729 (assignment for benefit of
creditors) (1973).
3) Comment, Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors in California: A Proposed Revision of
Ineffectual Statutory Provisions, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 573 (1959).
Civil Procedure; state tax liens
Fish and Game Code §§8048, 8049, 8050, 8051 (repealed); §8048 (new);
Government Code §§7220, 7221, 7222, 7223, 7224, 7225, 7226, 7227,
27282 (amended); Public Resources Code §3772 (repealed); §§3772,
3772.2, 3772.4, 3772.6, 3772.8 (new); §§3744, 3768 (amended); Reve-
nue and Taxation Code §§6757, 6757.5 7871, 7872, 8996, 16061,
16062, 16063, 16064, 18881, 18882, 18882.5, 18883, 26161, 26161.5,
30322, 32386 (repealed); §§6757, 7872, 8996, 16063, 16063.5, 18881,
26161, 30322, 32363, 32386 (new); §§6711, 6738, 6756, 6776, 7851,
7881, 8952, 8991, 8992, 8993, 8994, 9001, 16065, 16071, 16121,
18831, 18863, 18884.5, 18886, 18933, 26162.5, 26251, 26312, 30301,
30311, 30321, 30341, 32365, 32381 (amended); Unemployment Insur-
ance Code §§1703, 1703.5 (repealed); §1703 (new); §§1702, 1704.5,
1755, 1785, 1815, 1816, 1852 (amended).
AB 1467 (Suitt); STATS 1977, Ch 481
(Effective July 1, 1978)
Support: Board of Equalization; California Attorney General; California
Bankers Association; California Land Title Association; Controller's
Office; Department of Benefit Payments; Franchise Tax Board; Intera-
gency Task Force on the Revision of State Tax Lien Law.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 481, although many governmental
agencies had the authority to acquire and record state tax liens on the real or
personal property of a debtor, the procedures for creating and recording such
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liens were varied. Chapter 481 establishes a uniform system for the creation,
recordation and determination of the priority of state tax liens [See CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE §32363 (alcoholic beverage tax liens). Compare CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE §8048 with CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 456, §8049, at 1434
(commercial fishing packing and processing license and tax liens). Com-
pare CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772 with CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1398, §37, at
3277 (geothermal resource charge liens). Compare CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§6757 with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 863, §2, at 2464 (sales and use tax liens).
Compare CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §7872 with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 690,
§ 1, at 2070 (motor vehicle fuel license tax liens). Compare CAL. REV. &
TAX CODE §8996 with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 690, §2, at 2071 (use and fuel
tax liens). Compare CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 16063 with CAL. STATS.
1943, c. 658, §1, at 2347 (gift tax liens). Compare CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§18881 with CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1307, §10, at 2597 (personal income tax
liens). Compare CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §26161 with CAL. STATS. 1971,
c. 1307, § 12, at 2597 (bank and corporate tax liens). Compare CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE §30322 with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 690, §4, at 2071 (cigarette
tax liens). Compare CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1703 with CAL. STATS.
1974, c. 827, §2, at 1786 (unemployment compensation and disability
payment liens)]. Moreover, Chapter 481, which will become operative July
1, 1978 [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 481, §79, at -], provides that any lien and
any rights or causes of action under a state lien recorded in any county
pursuant to the prior law will continue in full force and effect for a period of
ten years from the last date of recordation or extension [See CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE §8048(g); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(g); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §§6757(g), 7872(g), 8996(g), 16063(g), 18881(g), 26161(g),
30322(g), 32363(g); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703 (g)]. In addition, a lien
recorded under the prior law may be extended during this ten year period
and a lien so extended will have the same effect as a lien filed under the new
procedure except that its priority will be determined pursuant to the prior
law [See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §8048(g); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§3772(g); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§6757(g), 7872(g), 8996(g),
16063(g), 18881(g), 26261(g), 30322(g), 32363(g); CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE §1703(g)].
Under the procedure prescribed by Chapter 481, a state tax lien in the
amount of the tax plus penalties, costs, and interest is perfected and enforce-
able at the time the tax becomes "due and payable" [CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE §8048(a); CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §3772(a); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§6757(a), 7872(a), 8996(a), 16063(a), 18881(a), 26161(a), 30322(a),
32363(a); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(a)]. For purposes of this proce-
dure, a tax becomes "due and payable" on the date a return is required to be
filed if a taxpayer fails to pay the amount due or on the date a determination
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or assessment of the particular tax is made [See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§8048(a); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(a); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§6757(a), 7872(a), 8996(a), 16063(a), 18881(a), 26161(a), 30322(a),
32363(a); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1703(a)]. A state tax lien is enforceable
upon all property and rights to property whether real or personal, tangible or
intangible, including all after-acquired property and rights to property,
belonging to the taxpayer and located in the state [CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§8048(a); CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §3772(a); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§6757(a), 7872(a), 8996(a), 16063(a), 18881(a), 26161(a), 30322(a),
32363(a); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(a)].
Chapter 481 specifically provides that a state tax lien extends to any
action or special proceeding in which a taxpayer may become entitled to
property or a money judgment and any judgment that the taxpayer subse-
quently procures, notwithstanding other statutory limitations applicable to
liens and execution on actions and judgments [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§688, 688.1; CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §8048(f); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§3772(f); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§6757(f), 7872(f), 8996(f), 16063(f),
18881(f), 26161(f), 30322(f), 32363(f); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(f)].
Notice of a tax lien relevant to such an action must be given to all parties
who have made an appearance in the action and to judgment creditors who
have been granted a lien or an order permitting intervention, and no com-
promise, settlement, dismissal, or satisfaction may be entered into by the
taxpayer with any other party, lienor, or intervenor in the action without the
consent of the taxing agency unless the lien has been satisfied or discharged
[CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §8048(f); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(f); CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE §§6757(f), 7872(f), 8996(f), 16063(f), 18881(f),
26161(f), 30322(f), 32363(f); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(f)]. In addi-
tion, the priority of a state tax lien on a cause of action or judgment is now
determined from the time of filing of the notice in the action [CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE §8048(f); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(f); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §§6757(f), 7872(f), 8996(f), 16063(f), 18881(f), 26161(f), 30322(f),
32363(f); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(f)].
The initial duration of a state tax lien cannot exceed ten years from the
time the tax became due and payable, unless the lien is recorded or filed, in
which case it will continue for ten years from the date the notice of the lien
was recorded or filed [See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §8048(a)-(e); CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §3772(a)-(e); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§6757(a)-(e),
7872(a)-(e), 8996(a)-(e), 16063(a)-(e), 18881(a)-(e), 26161(a)-(e), 30322
(a)-(e), 32363(a)-(e); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(a)-(e)]. These tax
liens, however, may be extended for an additional ten years by recording or
filing a new notice within ten years from the date of the recording or filing of
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the prior notice or from the date of the last extension of the lien [See CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE §8048(e); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(e); CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE §§6757(e), 7872(e), 8996(e), 16063(e), 18881(e), 26161(e),
30322(e), 32363(e); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(e)]. A state tax lien on
real property may be recorded in the office of the county recorder of the
county in which the property is located and a state tax lien on personal
property may be filed with the Secretary of State, but in either case the
recorded or filed notice must contain: (1) the name and last known address
of the person liable for the tax; (2) the amount of the tax; (3) a statement that
the tax will be a lien upon all real or personal property and rights to such
property, including all after-acquired property and rights to property belong-
ing to such person; and (4) a statement that the department has complied
with all the applicable provisions in the computation and levy of the amount
assessed [CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §8048(b)-(d); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§3772(b)-(d); CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§6757(b)-(d), 7872(b)-(d),
8996(b)-(d), 16063(b)-(d), 18881(b)-(d), 26161(b)-(d), 30322(b)-(d),
32363(b)-(d); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(b)-(d)].
Chapter 481 also establishes the relative priority of state tax liens with
respect to other security interests. A tax lien on realproperty is only inferior
to a right, title, or interest in land acquired or perfected prior to the
recordation of a notice of a state tax lien by: (1) a successor in interest of the
taxpayer without knowledge of the lien; (2) a holder of a security interest;
(3) a mechanic's lienor; or (4) a judgment lien creditor [CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE §8048(b); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(b); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§6757(b), 7872(b), 8996(b), 16063(b), 18881(b), 26161(b), 30322(b),
32363(b); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(b)]. Similarly, under the new law
a state tax lien on personal property is only inferior to: (1) a holder who
perfects his or her security interest in the manner specified by the Uniform
Commercial Code prior to the time the notice of the tax lien is filed; (2) any
person, other than the tax debtor, who without knowledge of the tax lien
acquires and perfects his or her interest in the property according to the law
prior to the time the notice is filed; (3) a buyer in the ordinary course of
business who would take free of a security interest created by his or her
seller; or (4) any person, other than the tax debtor, who holds specified
negotiable instruments that are given priority over a state tax lien or who
holds an interest that has priority over a security interest held by a third party
[See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §8048(c); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(c);
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§6757(c), 7872(c), 8996(c), 16063(c), 18881(c),
26161(c), 30322(c), 32363(c); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(c)]. Thus,
Chapter 481 establishes a uniform procedure for the creation, recordation,
and determination of the priority of state tax liens.
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The Internal Revenue Code similarly provides that failure to pay any tax
creates a lien from the time an assessment of tax liability is made upon all
property and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer [I.R.C. §§6321,
6322 (1970)]. Under the universal principle that "a prior lien gives a prior
claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds,"
i.e. "the first in time is the first in right" [United States v. New Britain, 347
U.S. 81, 85 (1954); Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827)],
a federal tax lien would be given priority over a state tax lien that had not
been recorded before the federal tax was assessed because under the prior
law a state tax lien did not arise until it was recorded [See CAL. STATS.
1974, c. 827, §2, at 1786; CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1307, §§10, 12, at 2597;
CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1398, §37, at 3277; CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 690, §§1,
2, 4, at 2070-71; CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 863, §2, at 2464; CAL. STATS. 1957,
c. 456, §8049, at 1434; CAL. STATS. 1943, c. 658, §1, at 2347].
In order to eliminate the preferential status afforded to federal tax liens
resulting from the fact that such liens attach at the time the assessment is
made, Chapter 481 provides that a state tax lien also attaches when an
assessment of state liability is made or when a taxpayer fails to pay the
amount due on the date a return is required to be filed [CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE §8048(a); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §3772(a); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§6757(a), 7872(a), 8996(a), 16063(a), 18881(a), 26161(a), 30322(a),
32363(a); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1703(a)]. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that if a state tax lien is created under a statute
modeled after the federal statute, then a competing federal lien does not
have priority over the state lien and the principal that "the first in time is the
first in right" must be applied [See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S.
351, 358-59 (1964)]. In light of the express priority given to the payment of
indebtedness owing to the federal government, the Supreme Court and
subsequent decisions of lower federal courts have noted that federal tax liens
lack priority over the tax liens of subordinate governmental entities only in
cases in which the tax debtor was solvent [United States v. Vermont, 377
U.S. 351, 358 (1964); see, e.g., Hinkley & Donovan v. Paine, 424 F.
Supp. 1013, 1015 (D.N.H. 1977), United States v. Davis, 247 F. Supp. 84,
88 (E.D. Mich. 1965); 31 U.S.C. §191 (1970)]. When the tax debtor is
insolvent the indebtedness to the federal government must be satisfied
before a state tax lien issued pursuant to Chapter 481 may be satisfied [See
United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 (1964). But see Thriftway
Auto Rental Corp. v. Herzog, 457 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1972)]. Thus, by
bringing the time at which a state tax lien attaches to the property of the tax
debtor into parity with the federal provision, Chapter 481 results in the
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application of the "first in time, first in right" principle when there is a
federal tax lien competing with a state tax lien and the tax debtor is solvent.
See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions §§344-345 (state tax liens) (2d ed. 1970).
2) 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation §§160-178 (state tax liens) (8th ed.
1974), (Supp. 1976).
Civil Procedure; mechanic's lien-preservation of arbitration
rights
Code of Civil Procedure §1281.5 (new).
AB 322 (Bannai); STATS 1977, Ch 135
Support: State Bar of California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 135, the effect of filing a mechanic's
lien, or an action to enforce such a lien, upon a contractual arbitration
provision was uncertain [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, SPECIAL COMM.
ON ARBrrRATION INTERIM REPORT at 4 (March 1976)]. Apparently, the mere
filing of a claim for a mechanic's lien could have constituted a waiver of any
contractual right to arbitration [See Palm Springs Homes, Inc. v. Western
Desert, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 270, 276, 30 Cal. Rptr. 34, 38 (1963);
Annot., 73 A.L.R. 3d 1066, 1071 n.17 (mechanics' liens and arbitration
rights) (1976)]. Furthermore, an action brought to foreclose a lien was
generally deemed a waiver of arbitration rights [See Titan Enterprises, Inc.
v. Armo Constr., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 828, 832, 108 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459
(1973); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 3d 1066, 1071-72 (mechanics' liens and arbitra-
tion rights) (1976)]. The California Court of Appeal, however, in Home-
stead Savings and Loan Association v. Superior Court [195 Cal. App. 2d
697, 16 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1961)] appeared to reach contrary conclusions on
both of these issues by holding that the plaintiff had not waived his arbitra-
tion rights by either filing a mechanic's lien or bringing an action to
foreclose the lien [Id. at 701, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23]. The conclusions
reached in Homestead have been distinguished from holdings in subsequent
cases based upon the fact that in Homestead the plaintiff had requested a
stay in his action for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien pending the comple-
tion of the contractually required arbitration process [See Titan Enterprises,
Inc. v. Armo Constr., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 828, 832-33, 108 Cal. Rptr.
456, 459 (1973); Palm Springs Homes, Inc. v. Western Desert, Inc., 215
Cal. App. 2d 270, 276, 30 Cal. Rptr. 34, 38 (1963); STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, SPECIAL COMM. ON ARBITRATION INTERIM REPORT, Exhibit B
at 1, 3 (March 1976)]. Thus, under the prior law the filing of a mechanic's
lien or an action to enforce such a lien in California was sometimes deemed
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a waiver of the right to arbitrate [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, SPECIAL
COMM. ON ARBITRATION INTERIM REPORT, Exhibit B at 3 (March 1976)].
Furthermore, based upon this same case law, it would appear that claim-
ants seeking to recover the value of materials and services were previously
faced with an onerous dilemma. In order to enforce mechanics' liens,
claimants are generally required to record a claim of lien within 90 days
after the completion of work [See CAL. CIV. CODE §§3115, 3116] and must
ordinarily bring an action to foreclose such a lien within 90 days of
recordation to preserve this lien [See CAL. CIV. CODE §3144]. At the same
time these, claimants were frequently confronted with contract provisions
requiring that certain disputes growing out of the contract be submitted to
arbitration [See Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 1066, 1068 (mechanics' liens and
arbitration rights) (1976)]. Thus, in light of the case law discussed earlier,
claimants were required to choose between the apparently mutually exclu-
sive options of preserving their lien or complying with their contractual
obligation to arbitrate. Not only did the prior law pose this dilemma to
potential claimants, but it also resulted in the conflict of two separate public
policies: (1) encouraging arbitration as opposed to litigation, which imposes
a greater burden on both the litigants and the courts; and (2) protecting the
right of a claimant to security for payment for work performed or materials
supplied [Id.].
Chapter 135 has apparently been enacted to now allow lien claimants to
comply with their obligation to arbitrate while preserving their mechanics'
liens. This new law provides that any person who now records a mechanic's
lien does not thereby waive any right to arbitration that such person may
have pursuant to a written agreement [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1281.5].
When filing an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, however, a claimant
must now simultaneously present to the court an application requesting that
such action be stayed pending arbitration of any issue, question, or dispute
that is claimed to be arbitrable under an arbitration agreement and that is
relevant to the action to enforce the claim of lien [See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §1281.5]. By thus indicating an intent to comply with the arbitration
provisions, claimants make clear that they have no desire to violate, avoid,
or waive any arbitration terms in their contract while employing other legal
means to obtain payment for services rendered [See Homestead Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 697, 701, 16 Cal. Rptr.
121, 123 (1961)]. In addition, the claimant is permitted to join with this
application any claim of lien that is within the jurisdiction of a municipal
court [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §1281.5]. Thus, Chapter 135 would appear to
encourage arbitration by mechanic's lien claimants while preserving their
right to collect payment for materials tendered and services rendered, by
providing that filing or enforcing such a lien does not constitute a waiver of
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any contractual right or obligation to submit the disputed payment issue to
arbitration.
See Generally:
1) M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §26.04 (mechanic's lien
as arbitration waiver) (1968); (Supp. 1977).
2) S. EAGER, THE ARBITRATION CONTRACT AND PROCEEDINGS §51 (mechanic's lien as arbitra-
tion waiver) (1971).
Civil Procedure; bail bond forfeiture and small claim court proce-
dure
Code of Civil Procedure § 120.4 (new); §116.4 (amended);
Penal Code §1306 (amended).
SB 1107 (Song); STATS 1977, Ch 889
Support: California Judges Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 889, if a court declared a bail bond
forfeiture but lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment in an action arising
upon a contract of similar nature and amount, such court was required to
deliver the bond and a certified copy of its order declaring the bond forfeited
to the district attorney or civil legal advisor of the board of supervisors of the
county in which the court is located [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1194, §3, at
2329]. The district attorney or county legal advisor was then required to
immediately file the bond and a certified copy of the forfeiture in a court that
had jurisdiction to render a judgment in such an action [CAL. STATS. 1969,
c. 1194, §3, at 2329]. Chapter 889 has amended Section 1306 of the Penal
Code to now permit any superior, municipal, or justice court that has
declared the forfeiture of a bail bond to enter a summary judgment against
each bondsperson named in the bond in the amount for which the bondsper-
son has bound himself or herself, regardless of the amount of the bail [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1306]. This amendment to the Penal Code will arguably
simplify and expedite the procedure for entering summary judgment against
a bondsperson after a bond has been forfeited.
Chapter 889 also enacts provisions that modify the procedures and admin-
istration of small claims courts. Formerly, when a plaintiff filed an action in
small claims court, the judge or clerk was required to sign an order directing
the defendant to appear on the hearing date and a copy of this order was sent
to the defendant and no other option was available to the judge or clerk [See
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1289, §2, at - ]. Chapter 889 provides that a small
claims court judge or clerk may now, in the alternative, cause a copy of the
claim to be mailed to the defendant and upon proof of service, sign an order
setting the hearing date and cause this hearing order to be served upon both
the defendant and plaintiff [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §116.4(b)(2)]. The
methods of service available in small claims court have been limited by
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other legislation enacted in this session to: (1) personal service; (2) service
by mail; (3) service by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the
defendant's home; and (4) service by leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint at the defendant's place of business [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c.
46, § 1, at - ]. Regardless of whether the hearing date is set before or after a
defendant is served by mail with notice of the claim against him or her, this
date is to be set ten to 40 days after the date of receipt of the proof of service,
or if the defendant resides outside the county, 30 to 70 days after the receipt
of the proof of service [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1 16.4(b)(2)]. This alterna-
tive was arguably added to enable more defendants to receive such notice in
time to appear in small claims court actions.
Finally, Chapter 889 permits the Judicial Council to provide by rule for
the necessary court attach6s and employees to implement the provisions
governing an experimental project involving a modified small claims court
procedure [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §120.4. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§120-122.2]. Thus, the various changes enacted by Chapter 889
provide an efficient bond forfeiture procedure, which permits the court that
declares a forfeiture to retain jurisdiction regardless of the amount of the
bail, permits a judge or clerk of a small claims court to notify the defendant
of a claim before a hearing date is set, and allows the Judicial Council to
furnish the necessary support personnel for experimental programs in the
small claims courts.
See Generally:
1) B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Proceedings Before Trial §163 (procedure
of bail bond forfeiture) (1963), (Supp. 1977).
2) 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§189, 190, 192, 193 (small claims court) (2d
ed. 1970); §§187B (small claims court experimental project), §§191A, 192A (small claims
court) (Supp. 1975).
3) 9 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 389 (small claims court)
(1978).
4) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 241 (small claims court)
(1977).
Civil Procedure; small claims court
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 116.4, 116.6, 117.3, 117.4 (amended).
AB 317 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 46
(Effective May 14, 1977)
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 46 has been enacted to make several evidentiary and procedural
changes in the law governing small claims courts. Due to an apparent
omission in legislation passed in 1976, the law allowed only a party to the
action to participate in the prosecution or defense of his or her case in small
claims court [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1289, §2, at - ]. This provision
apparently precluded the introduction of any evidence in a case without the
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presence of the actual party to the action [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1289,
§2, at - ]. Pursuant to Chapter 46, a party is once again permitted to send a
representative (other than an attorney), such as a bookkeeper or an account-
ant, in his or her place to introduce evidence of an account, which must fail
within the business records exception to the hearsay rule to be admissible
[CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §117.4. See generally CAL. EvmD. CODE §§1270,
12711.
Prior to enactment of Chapter 46, service of process in small claims court
could be completed in any manner authorized by law [CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1289, §2, at - ]. The law now specifically lists the following methods of
service as the only ones that may be used by small claims courts: (1)
personal service; (2) service by mail; (3) service by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint at the defendant's home; and (4) service by leaving
a copy of the summons and complaint at the defendant's place of business
[See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§116.4, 415.20]. In the small claims courts,
when service is to be completed by delivery to a defendant's place of
business or abode, pursuant to Section 415.20(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, Chapter 46 eliminates the requirement that these methods be
preceded by diligently attempted personal service [See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §116.4]. Personal service and service by mail shall be deemed
complete on the date of personal service or on the date that the defendant
signs the return receipt [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §116.4], while service by
delivery at the defendant's place of business or abode shall be deemed
complete ten days after an additional copy of the summons and complaint
are mailed by first-class, prepaid postage to the defendant [See CAL. CIV.
PRoc. CODE §§116.4,415.20]. Previously, when service was not completed
within the time frame required by Section 116.4, the court was not allowed
to proceed with the case if the defendant did not personally appear [CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1289, §2, at - 1. This situation required that a plaintiff
apply for a new order setting a new hearing date [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1289, §2, at -. Chapter 46 now requires the court to continue the case for
at least ten days and cause notice of the continuance to be mailed by first-
class mail to any defendant already served but who failed to appear [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §116.4].
Formerly, venue in small claims court was, for all purposes, the same as
for civil actions filed in justice or municipal court [CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1289, §2, at -1. Arguably, the treatment of cases in which venue was
improperly laid was also the same and, as a result, a transfer to a proper
court was on motion of a party and not of the court [See CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 1289, §2, at -; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §397]. In addition, a plaintiff was
required topay the costs and fees of such a transfer [See CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 1289, §2, at -; CAL. CW. PROC. CODE §3991. The law now permits a
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small claims court to dismiss without prejudice or to transfer an action to the
proper court on its own motion, or on a defendant's motion, without cost to
a plaintiff [CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 116.6].
Finally, prior to the enactment of Chapter 46, when an action in small
claims court involved more than one defendant, and one or more defendants
were not residents of the county in which the action was brought, the date
for the appearance of all the defendants could not be more than 30 days from
the date of the order to appear indicated on the summons [CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1289, §2, at - ]. The law now provides that the date for
appearance in such a case shall not be more than 70 days or less than 30 days
from the date of the order to appear [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §117.3]. Other
legislation enacted in this session further amends the procedure in small
claims court by permitting the court to either set a hearing date and then
cause notice to be served upon the defendant or to first cause notice to be
served upon the defendant and, then upon proof of service, to set a hearing
date [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 889, §2, at - ]. Thus, Chapter 46 would
appear to expedite proceedings in small claims courts by allowing, inter
alia, the introduction of evidence of an account without the presence of the
party and the transfer of a case to a court of proper venue on the court's own
motion and would generally seem to provide more reasonable procedures for
potential parties involved in proceedings in these courts [See CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §§116.4, 116.6, 117.3, 117.4].
See Generally:
1) I B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§189, 190, 192, 193 (small claims court) (2d
ed. 1970); §§191A, 192A (small claims court) (Supp. 1977).
2) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 241 (small claims court)
(1977).
Civil Procedure; general written denials
Code of Civil Procedure §431.40 (amended).
SB 158 (Zenovich); STATS 1977, Ch 93
Support: State Bar of California; Western Center on Law and Poverty
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 93, the law permitted a defendant to file
a general written denial and a brief statement of any new matter constituting
a defense, in lieu of a demurrer or other answer, in any action in which the
amount in controversy did not exceed $750, excluding interest [CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1389, §1, at -]. Prior to 1976, the monetary jurisdictional limit of
small claims courts was $500 [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 572, §1, at 1095].
Thus, two classes of defendants were previously entitled to use this sim-
plified responsive pleading: (1) a defendant in small claims court; and (2) a
defendant in municipal or justice court with a demand not exceeding $750
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[See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§83, 86116.2. Compare CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 1389, §1, at - and CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 562, §1, at 965 with CAL.
STATS. 1971, c. 572, §1, at 1095]. In 1976, however, the legislature
increased the monetary limit of jurisdiction of small claims courts to $750
[CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1289, §2, at -]. This change in the law eliminated
the distinction between those defendants who used the general written denial
in small claims court and those defendants whose demands were formerly
too large for small claims court but which did not exceed $750, even though
the nature of their claims apparently were such as to make the retention of
counsel economically prohibitive [Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §116.2
with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1389, §1, at - and CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1289,
§2, at -].
In an apparent effort to facilitate the ability of laypersons to represent and
defend themselves in a lawsuit in other than small claims court and to
maintain historical continuity, Chapter 93 has amended Section 431.40 of
the Code of Civil Procedure to increase to $1,000 the amount in controversy
under which a defendant may use the general written denial [See CAL. CIV.
Pitoc. CODE §431.40. Compare CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 562, §1, at 965,
CAL. STATS. 1951, c. 1737, §52, at 4101, and CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 744,
§26, at 1848 with CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 572, §1, at 1095, CAL. STATS 1949,
c. 451, §1, at 795, and CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 743, §30, at 1817]. The
general written denial for the purpose of Section 431.40 must, as before, be
on a form prescribed by the Judicial Council and available at the place of
filing, but need not be verified [CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §431.40(c)].
Additionally, as previously provided, the use of the general written denial
pursuant to Section 431.40 does not affect the requirements of law pertain-
ing to cross-complaints of the defendant [CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§431.40(b)]. Thus, in any action in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
or the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $1,000, the
defendant at his or her option may file a general written denial and a brief
statement of any new matter constituting a defense in lieu of a demurrer or
other answer [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §431.40(a)].
See Generally:
1) 3 B. WITIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading §903 (new matter constituting a defense)
(2nd ed. 1971).
2) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 241 (small claims courts)
(1977).
3) 4 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 318 (verified general
denial) (1973).
Civil Procedure; blind jurors
Code of Civil Procedure §§198, 205, 602 (amended).
SB 152 (Garcia); STATS 1977, Ch 591
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Support: California Association of the Physically Handicapped; National
Federation of the Blind; State Bar of California
Opposition: California District Attorneys' Association; California Police
Officers' Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 591, the law disqualified from jury
service any person who was not in possession of his or her natural faculties
[CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 172, §1, at 317]. Construing a New York statute on
juror qualifications similar to the prior law in California, an appellate court
in that state held that a blind person was not possessed of his or her natural
faculties [Lewinson v. Crews, 28 App. Div. 2d 111, 112, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83,
85 (1967). Compare CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 172, §1, at 317 with N.Y. JUD.
LAw §596 (McKinney)]. Consequently, it has been argued in this state that a
blind person was not in possession of his or her natural faculties within the
meaning of California's prior juror competency law [Op. CAL. LEGIS.
COUNSEL No. 491, Blind Jurors at 2 (Jan. 3, 1977) (copy on file at the
Pacific Law Journal)]. With the enactment of Chapter 591, however, this
prior law has been clarified to provide that no person shall be deemed
incompetent to act as a juror solely because of the loss of sight in any degree
[CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§198(2), 205(b)].
Inherent in the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial is the
concomitant right of each person to a fair and impartial jury [See People v.
Diaz, 105 Cal. App. 2d 690, 697, 234 P.2d 300, 305 (1951). See generally
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII, XIV, §1; CAL. CONST. art. I, §7]. The
presence of blind persons on a jury, therefore, raises the question of whether
there may be a denial of due process because of a denial of the right to a fair
and impartial jury. The argument propounded by various state courts is that
persons without sight are unable to render a fair and impartial verdict
because they are unable to judge the demeanor and deportment of witnesses
or evaluate physical evidence [Rhodes v. State, 128 Ind. 189, 196, 27 N.E.
866, 868 (1891); Lewinson v. Crews, 28 App. Div. 2d 111, 113, 282
N.Y.S. 83, 85 (1967); Black v. Continental Casualty Co., 9 S.W.2d 743,
744 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1928)]. Thus, if the testimony and evidence
presented does not have its full force on the jurors, a defendant will not have
been afforded his or her full rights [Lewinson v. Crews, 28 App. Div. 2d
111, 113-14, 282 N.Y.S. 83, 86 (1967)].
In Lewinson v. Crews [28 App. Div. 2d 111, 282N.Y.S. 83 (1967)], the
New York Appellate Court, while conceding that peremptory challenges are
inadequate to protect a litigant's right to a fair and impartial trial since they
are limited in number, indicated that challenges for cause, unlimited in
number, will satisfy the constitutional guarantees of due process and a fair
and impartial jury [See id. at 114, 282 N.Y.S. at 86]. Chapter 591 appears
to provide this constitutional guarantee by providing a challenge for cause if
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a defect exists in the visual or auditory functions of a person's body, which
satisfies the court that the prospective juror is incapable of performing the
duties of a juror in the particular action before the court [CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §602(2)]. Thus, rather than automatically excluding blind persons
from jury duty, Chapter 591 allows the litigants and the court to determine
in each case whether such individuals would be capable jurors [See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§198(3), 205(b)].
See Generally:
1) Zimmerman v. Carr, 59 Ind. App. 248, 109 N.E. 218 (1915).
2) 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §92 (qualifications of jurors) (2d ed. 1971),
(Supp. 1977).
3) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE DURING TRIAL
§§5.33-.56 (examination & challenge of jurors) (1963).
4) McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 19 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 501, 529 (1967-68).
Civil Procedure; competency of interpreters for administrative
hearings
Government Code §§11018, 11501.5 (new); §§ 11500, 11513 (amended).
SB 420 (Garcia); STATS 1977, Ch 1057
(Effective July 1, 1978)
Support: California Department of Motor Vehicles; California Rural
Legal Assistance
Opposition: California Franchise Tax Board
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1057 a party to an administrative
hearing who was not proficient in English was required to provide his or her
own interpreter [CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1390, §1, at 2887]. If the hearing
officer so directed, the agency having jurisdiction over the matter was
required to pay for the interpreter, otherwise the cost of these services had to
be paid by the party providing the interpreter [CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1390,
§1, at 2887]. Chapter 1057 substantially amends these provisions for
specified state agencies to require that an interpreter be provided at an
adjudicatory hearing for a party who is not proficient in English and who
requests the language assistance of an interpreter [CAL. GOV'T CODE
§11513(d)]. "Adjudicatory hearing" is defined by Chapter 1057 as a
hearing conducted by a state agency that involves the personal or property
rights of an individual, the granting or revocation of an individual's license,
or the resolution of an issue pertaining to an individual; provided that the
hearing includes at least sworn testimony, the right to cross examination, the
right to representation, and the issuance of a formal decision [CAL. GOv'T
CODE § 11500(f)]. Specifically excluded from the term "adjudicatory hear-
ing" are informal factfinding or investigatory hearings, with the provision
of an interpreter at such proceedings being discretionary [CAL. GOV'T CODE
§11500(f)]. Further, "[1]anguage assistance" is defined for the purposes of
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the new law as the oral interpretation or written translation of English into
another language, and its translation back again, for an individual who
cannot speak or understand English, or who has difficulty in so doing [CAL.
GOV'T CODE §11500(g)].
Under the new law, the hearing officer retains his or her discretion as to
which party shall bear the cost of the interpreter's services, but the officer is
now required, when making such a determination, to take into account "an
equitable consideration of all the circumstances in each case, such as the
ability of the party in need of interpreter to pay" [CAL. GOV'T CODE
§11513(d)]. This particular provision, however, is not applicable to pro-
ceedings of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board or the Division of
Industrial Accidents concerning workers' compensation claims [CAL.
GOv'T CODE §11513(d)]. These agencies are required to promulgate their
own regulations for apportioning the cost of such an interpreter [CAL. GoV'T
CODE § 11513(d)]. Chapter 1057 further requires the State Personnel Board
to establish criteria for testing an interpreter's compentency, both spoken
and written, in English and the appropriate second language [CAL. GoV'T
CODE §11513(d)(1)]. In addition, the employing agency is required to
establish testing procedures to ensure an interpreter's familiarity with the
requisite technical terminology and relevant hearing procedures [CAL.
Gov'T CODE §11513(d)(2)]. Once the interpreter has successfully com-
pleted both examinations, he or she is deemed to be approved by the hearing
officer [CAL. GOV'T CODE §11513(e)]. Furthermore, all state agencies that
conduct administrative hearings must comply with these provisions [CAL.
GoV'T CODE §11018] and are required to advise each party of his or her
right to an interpreter, and to encourage those individuals in need of an
interpreter to give timely notice of such need [CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 11513(g)]. The interpreter utilized in these proceedings may not have been
involved in the case prior to the hearing and all agency rules of confidentiali-
ty equally apply to the interpreter, whether or not such rules specifically
refer to the interpreter [CAL. GoV'T CODE §11513(h), (i)]. In situations in
which the qualified interpreter cannot attend the hearing, or for which there
is no qualified interpreter available, the hearing officer has discretionary
authority to "provisionally" qualify other interpreters [CAL. GOV'T CODE
§11513(f)]. In summary, Chapter 1057 has removed from the parties to an
adjudicatory hearing the burden of providing a language interpreter and has
also provided a method of certification of the competency of such interpre-
ters.
See Generally:
1) 4 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 332 (interpreters) (1973.
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Civil Procedure; order of restitution in administrative adjudica-
tions
Government Code §11519 (amended).
AB 1575 (Mori); STATS 1977, Ch 680
Support: California Department of Motor Vehicles
Opposition: California Realtors Association
Pursuant to the California Administrative Procedure Act [CAL. GOV'T
CODE § § 11370-11528], a private party who has been damaged as a result of
a breach of contract by a licensee subject to this act, may initiate a
proceeding to have that individual's license revoked, suspended or modified
[See CAL. GOV'T CODE §11503]. The written decision of the hearing officer
in such an action becomes final 30 days after the licensee-respondent is
notified of the decision unless: (1) a reconsideration is ordered; (2) the
enforcing agency orders the decisions to be effective at an earlier date; or (3)
a stay of execution is granted [CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11519(a)]. If a stay of
execution is granted, it may be accompanied by an express condition that the
licensee-respondent comply with specified terms of probation; the terms of
which must be just and reasonable in light of the findings and the decision
[CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11519(b)]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 680,
however, there was no authority to order a licensee, as a condition of
probation, to make restitution for damages caused by his or her breach of
contract [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 476, §1, at -].
Section 11519 of the Government Code, as amended by Chapter 680,
now provides administrative hearing officers with the authority to include an
order of restitution as a term of probation in a stay of execution [CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11519(d)]. This section further requires that any decision containing
such an order as a condition of probation must include findings that a breach
occurred and must specify the amount of actual damages sustained as a
result of such a breach [CAL. GOV'T CODE §11519(d)]. Finally, the amount
paid by a licensee-respondent pursuant to this order of restitution must be
credited against any judgment rendered against the licensee in a subsequent
civil action based on the same breach [CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11519(d)].
Normally, the recovery of restitutionary damages resulting from a breach
of contract requires lengthy and costly litigation in state courts [See 4 B.
WrTKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgement §§101-108 (pre-trial, trial &
post-trial expenses) (2d ed. 1971); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1975
JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 99-101
(1975) (elapsed time to trial)]. The changes implemented by Chapter 680,
however, appear to provide relief outside this costly litigation process to
persons aggrieved by a breach of contract when the breach is committed by a
person licensed by an agency subject to the California Administrative
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Procedure Act [See CAL. GOV'T CODE §11519]. Although disciplinary
action for breach of contract is not uncommon [See Moss, Protecting a
Contractor's License in an Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding, 46
L.A. B. BULL. 338, 341-43 (1971)], the revocation or suspension of a
licensee-respondent's license would seem to be of marginal relief to the
private citizen who suffered money damages. Thus, by granting administra-
tive hearing officers the power to issue orders of restitution, Chapter 680
would appear to provide aggrieved consumers with more tangible and
expedient relief than was previously available and to establish an additional
deterrent against breach of contract by specified licensees.
See Generally:
1) 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§321-328 (California
administrative law) (8th ed. 1974).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PRACTICE
§§4.33, .44, .45 (post-hearing procedures) (1970).
3) Molinari, California Administrative Process: A Synthesis Updated, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW.
274 (1969-70).
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